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I 
Stock options have recently been the subject of a heated debate within the 
accounting and business community. The primary issue has been whether or not 
companies should expense stock options that are used to compensate employees. 
After the first quarter of 2006, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (F ASB) 
is requiring companies to begin reporting as expenses all stock options that are 
used as compensation, just as if the options had been any other form of employee 
compensation. The ramifications of this change could be far-reaching and could 
drastically affect the bottom line of many companies' income statements. In this 
essay, I will attempt to provide information that will enlighten the average person 
as to what exactly stock options are and how they operate. From there I will 
attempt to determine if the decision by F ASB was the correct move for dealing 
with stock options. 
Stock options are a specific "type of option that uses the stock itself as an 
underlying instrument to determine the options value" ("Stock option"). In 
employee compensation packages, the option works like a contract to buy shares 
of stock in the future for a set amount of money, regardless of the stocks actual 
price at the time of the purchase. For example, assume that you were given stock 
options by your employer that gave you the right to purchase 1,000 shares of stock 
at a cost of$30 (the strike price) per share at some time in the future. If the actual 
stock price was $20 at the time you were given the options, then you would wait 
for the stock price to rise to the point that it would be profitable for you to 
purchase them at the strike price. If the stock rose to $40 dollars over the next five 
years, then you could execute your options and purchase the stock at $30 per 
share. Then you would own stock worth $40,000 ($40/share x 1,000 shares) even 
though you paid only $30,000 ($30/share x 1,000 shares) for that stock, which 
results in a gain of$10,000. This gain could increase very quickly ifthere was a 
large gain in stock price and if a lot of shares (100,000 shares, for instance) were 
promised in the compensation package ("Stock option"). 
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Although stock options sound like a great idea when simply defmed, they 
have proven to be a lot of trouble when used in the real world. Over the last 
decade, scandals and frauds have been abundant and many of these problems were 
directly or indirectly related to the use of stock options. Unfortunately, many 
individual investors have been devastated and many innocent employees have lost 
their jobs because of these problems. From Enron to WorldCom, these failures 
have caused people to reevaluate the way that accounting is practiced within these 
corporations. The larger issues, such as fmancial statement mismanagement and a 
lack of independence in the accounting community, were primarily dealt with 
through the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. However, the use of stock options as 
compensation by corporations and the financial statement representation of these 
transactions were left on the table for some time. It was only in the last couple of 
years that serious efforts to change the way that stock options were treated when 
used as compensation. Stiff opposition met these efforts and even though the 
changes have been made, the debate rages on. 
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There are two primary conflicts regarding stock options when used as 
compensation. The first involves the motivational effectiveness of these types of 
wages as opposed to cash. Those who support the use of stock options argue that 
this type of compensation aligns the employees' interests with the company's 
interests, particularly with the long-term interests of the company. This is because 
the proponents of stock options believe that the employees will have an incentive 
to help the company do well, because when the company does well, the stock will 
do well and when the stock does well, the employees will make money. One 
study, which was conducted by Mark Bauman, reiterates the fact that executive 
compensation packages often "include stock options in order to better align the 
interests of managers and outside shareholders" (Bauman). 
Those who argue against the use of stock options concede that the high 
ranking officials in the company (CEO, CFO, etc.) will have added incentive to 
raise the stock price, but they argue that it does not necessarily follow that they 
will have added incentive to help the company do well in the long-term. The 
conclusions of the study mentioned above show that regardless of the proposed 
purpose of the stock option plans, "the use of stock-based compensation intensifies 
top executives' focus on fmancial analysts' short-term earnings forecasts" 
(Bauman). This focus can be counterproductive. Instead of focusing on 
positioning the company for success in the future, top executives may simply try 
to make the company look as good as possible in the short-term. Indeed, stock 
options essentially create a conflict of interest for the top executives. By using 
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underhanded accounting methods and faulty presentations of the actual condition 
of the company, the executives in a firm may cause the stock price to rise 
significantly. They can then execute their options before the market realizes the 
actual condition of the company and thereby the executives can make millions of 
dollars (some executives have made stock gains in excess of $100,000,000) - all at 
the expense of average investors ("Executive Pay"). 
The second conflict deals with the accounting practices that are used in 
dealing with stock option compensation packages. Before the changes that F ASB 
recently made, "options were invisible on the corporate income statement. No 
matter how many a company handed out, they could tell investors that they cost 
nothing" (Gimein). Many argue that options should be reported as a compensation 
expense just as cash compensation would be reported. Being able to pay your 
employees without actually incurring any costs to yourself for that payment seems 
too good to be true, they argue. It also leaves investors with an incomplete picture 
of companies' financial situations. 
Those who argue against expensing stock options say that investors will not 
value the information provided by the new reporting requirements. As it turns out, 
this argument may be a valid one. Indeed, one article in The Wall Street Journal 
that was written shortly after companies began to report options compensation as 
an expense is titled "Wall Street turns Blind Eye to Results of Option Expensing" 
(Gullapalli). Another argument is that many companies will be hurt financially by 
such changes and that small companies will not be able to get off the ground 
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without stock options packages that are "off the books." Those opposed to 
expensing options also say that "CEOs might well lose little or nothing" as a result 
of the changes proposed and recently implemented by FASB (Gimein). They 
argue that excessive compensation for CEOs and other top executives is the 
primary concern of most proponents of stock option expensing, and that this 
cannot be solved simply by forcing companies to expense stock options. They 
argue that the problem is not in the stock option plans, but in the accounting 
controls that allow executives to "fudge" the numbers. According to critics, the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act was enough to clear up these problems and since these issues 
have been addressed, stock options can now be used without significantly 
increasing the risk of fraudulent activities. 
What will the end result of this conflict be? As of right now, it looks like 
the expensing of stock options is here to stay. The effects of these changes are far 
less certain. Hopefully, the effects will be in line with FASB's goals. Based on 
my understanding of the situation, the goals of the FASB's new accounting 
standard has two parts: to guard against exorbitant executive compensation 
packages and to ensure that companies are being accurately portrayed to the public 
in order to guard the assets of current and potential investors. One likely effect of 
these accounting changes is that there won't be as many stock options in 
compensation plans anymore, since one of the main incentives for using them 
(benefits for the employees with no effect on the bottom line) is gone. Many 
companies have already been phasing out many of their stock option plans in order 
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to prepare for the pending changes. Companies have also been phasing in some of 
the stock options compensation packages into their income statements in order to 
lessen the impact of the predicted 3% reduction in earnings aggregately (Henry). 
Fortunately, because many companies have made such adjustments, it appears that 
the impact of the accounting changes on companies' actual net income is probably 
not going to be as catastrophic as originally thought by critics of the F ASB 
proposal. 
In conclusion, I think that F ASB has made the correct decision on this 
Issue. It is encouraging to see that the people who are responsible for the 
accounting practices of U.S. firms take their responsibilities seriously. Only time 
can tell what the long-term effect of this decision will be but if we pay close 
attention now, we may be able to avoid more serious problems in the future. 
Accountants should always be reevaluating their practices and developing new 
techniques and standards to protect investors and to thwart those who try to use 
"gray" accounting procedures to benefit themselves at great loss to others. 
Hopefully, we can learn from the mistakes of the past and implement changes that 
will safeguard the investors of the future. 
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